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INTERVENTION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST UNDER
RULE 24(a)(2) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides guidelines and

procedures for a person who is not party to a law suit (hereinafter, applicant)
to intervene and become a party in the lawsuit.' The purpose of Rule 24 is
to allow an applicant to protect any interest the applicant may have in the
outcome of the action. 2 Under Rule 24(a) an applicant has a right to

intervene in an action in two circumstances. 3 First, under Rule 24(a)(1) an
applicant has a right to intervene in an action when a United States statute
gives the applicant an unconditional right to intervene. 4 Second, under Rule
24(a)(2) an applicant has the right to intervene in an action when the

applicant can show an interest in the outcome of the action.'
An applicant can show an interest in the outcome of an action under
Rule 24(a)(2) in two ways. 6 First, an applicant can show that the outcome

1. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (setting forth criteria for determining whether applicant has right
to intervene in an action). Rule 24 uses the term "applicant" to refer to a person who desires
to intervene in an action. Id. For the purposes of this note, "applicant" shall refer to any
person asserting a right to intervene or requesting to intervene in an action.
2. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-111 (1966) (Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 24 stating that Rule 24 enables applicant to protect interest in
action); 3B J. KENNEDY & J. MooRE, MooR,'s FEDERAL PRACTICE (hereinafter, MooRE's
PRACTICE) § 24.02 (1987) (stating that purpose of Rule 24 is to enable applicant to
protect interest in action).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1),(2) (setting forth criteria for courts to determine when
applicant has right to intervene). If an applicant can not assert a right to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2), the applicant may apply to a court to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b). FED.
R. Crv. P. 24(b); see MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.10 (discussing Rule 24(b)). An applicant
has no right to intervene under Rule 24(b), but may intervene under Rule 24(b) if a court, in
its discretion, finds that the applicant should be permitted to intervene. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b);
see MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.10 (discussing Rule 24(b)).
4. See FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(1) (setting forth applicant's right to intervene in action
when United States statute confers right to intervene).
5. See FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2) (setting forth applicant's right to intervene in action
when applicant can demonstrate interest in action). Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states as follows:
Upon Timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ...
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
6. Id. Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth two types of interest an applicant may show in an action.
Id.; see infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing two types of interests applicant may
show in action to meet requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)).
FEDERAL
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of the action will harm the applicant's property interest in the action. 7
Second, the applicant can show that the outcome of the action may have

some detrimental effect on the applicant's legal interests.' Rule 24(a)(2),
however, does not clearly state what type of detrimental impact the outcome

of an action must have on an applicant's legal interests for the applicant

to have a right to intervene. 9 Applicants have attempted to show a wide

variety of legal interests in actions to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).10 In
several cases applicants have attempted to intervene in actions under Rule
24(a)(2) claiming that they represent the legal interests of the public." The
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on the question of
whether Rule 24(a)(2) permits an applicant to intervene to represent the
public interest. 2
7. FED. R. Civ P. 24(a)(2); see MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2] (discussing
property interest in action under Rule 24(a)(2)). An applicant showing a property interest in
an action generally has established a right to intervene in the action under Rule 24(a)(2). See
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2]; Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Environs Dev. Corp., 601
F.2d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that contractor's lien on property destroyed by fire
created sufficient interest under Rule 24(a)(2)); Corby Recreation Inc. v. General Electric Co.,
581 F.2d 175, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that owner of building had sufficient interest to
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in action involving fire damage).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2] (discussing
applicant's non-property interest in action under Rule 24(a)(2)). Courts have never clearly
established the nature of the interest an applicant must show to demonstrate a right to intervene
in an action under Rule 24(a)(2). See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2]; infra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing courts' difficulty defining interest required by Rule 24(a)(2)).
9. See, e.g., Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that courts
cannot easily define interest required by Rule 24(a)(2)); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus,
644 F.2d 849, 850-51 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that interest required by Rule 24(a)(2) defies
easy definition); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that precise nature
of interest required by Rule 24(a)(2) is not clear).
10. See Dilks v. Aloha Airlines, 642 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1981) (union asserting
right to intervene in wrongful discharge actidn to argue for correct interpretation of collective
bargaining agreement); DuPree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Mexican ambassador asserting right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect Mexican
nationals); Horton v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 735, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1970)
(National Education Association asserting interest in desegregation case). MooRE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 24.07[2] at 24-55 to 24-62, nn.4-21 (discussing various interests asserted by
applicants under Rule 24(a)(2)).
11. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (public
interest group seeking to intervene to represent public's interests in action); Washington State
Bldg. and Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Idaho v. Freeman,
625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977) (government
official asserting right to intervene to represent public's interests in action).
For the purposes of this note, an interest shown by an applicant seeking to intervene in
an action to protect the public's interests in an action shall be treated as a separate category
of interest.
For the purposes of this note, an applicant's attempt to represent the "public's interest"
in an action shall refer to any interest not unique to the applicant that an applicant seeks to
protect by intervening in an action. The "public's interest" shall include political and social
policies advocated by an applicant, as well as challenges to political and social policies ostensibly
raised for the benefit of society generally or for some significant portion of society.
12. See infranotes 54-138 and accompanying text (discussing disagreements among Circuit
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When courts address the question of whether an applicant has a right
under Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene in an action to represent the interests of
the public in the action, the courts' analyses often focus primarily on the
adequacy of the applicant's interest in the action. 3 The applicant's interest
in the action, however, is only one of the requirements set out in Rule
24(a)(2). 14 Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth'a four part test for a court to determine
when an applicant has the right to intervene." First, the applicant must file
a timely request for intervention that conforms to the requirements of Rule

Courts over applicants right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect public's
interests).
13. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that applicant's
interest in action was most important factor in court's decision); Athens Lumber Co. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (setting forth applicant's
lack of interest in action as one of two reasons for rejecting applicant's motion to intervene).
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2); see Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(stating that Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth three requirements for applicant to meet to intervene
under Rule 24(a)(2)). In Nuesse v. Camp the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia became the first appellate court to interpret the present version of Rule
24(a)(2). Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 699. In-Nuesse a Wisconsin bank sued the United States
Comptroller of the Currency to prevent the Comptroller from issuing a certificate of approval
to a competing bank. Id. at 698. The Commissioner of Banks of the State of Wisconsin filed
a motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. The Commissioner asserted that the plaintiff
in the action might not represent the Commissioner's interests in the action adequately. Id.
In addressing the Commissioner's motion to intervene, the D.C. Circuit held that Rule
24(a)(2) set forth a three part test for courts to determine whether an applicant has a right to
intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 699. First, the D.C. Circuit held that the
applicant must show an interest in the action. Id. Second, the D.C. Circuit held, the applicant
must show that the outcome of the action might impede the applicant's ability to protect that
interest. Id. Third, the D.C. Circuit held, the applicant must demonstrate that the parties in
the action might not represent adequately the applicant's interest in the action. Id. The D.C.
Circuit held that the Commissioner met the requirements of the test set forth under Rule
24(a)(2) and granted the Commissioner's motion to intervene. Id. at 706.
The D.C. Circuit in Nuesse characterized the test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) as a three part
test. Id. at 699. Other courts include the timeliness requirement set forth at the beginning of
Rule 24(a) and apply a four part test. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987)
(setting forth four part test including timeliness under Rule 24(a)(2)); MooRE's FEDERAL

PRAcTcCE § 24.0711] at 24-50 (same). Because the four part test simply adds the timeliness
requirement of Rule 24(a) to the criteria set forth in Rule 24(a)(2), the results are the same in
both cases. MooRE's FEDERAL. PRAcTcE § 24.0711].
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see, e.g., Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir.
1987) (setting forth four part test for applicant to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)); Pennsylvania
v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 504 (3d Cir) cert. denied sub nom. Fire Fighters Union v. Pennsylvania,
426 U.S. 921 (1976) (same); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 24.07[1], 24-50 (same).
Several courts have characterized the four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) as a "strike
one, you're out" test. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Greaves, 110 F.R.D. 549, 550 (D.R.I.
1986) (stating that applicant must meet all four parts of test under Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene).
If an applicant fails to fulfill the requirements of any part of the four part test, the applicant
has no right to intervene. Id.; see infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing four
part test set forth under Rule 24(a)(2)).
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24(c).16 Second, the applicant must demonstrate some interest relating to
the action.17 Third, the applicant must show that the interest may be impaired
if the court does not permit the applicant to intervene." Fourth, the applicant
must show that none of the original parties to the action will represent the
applicant's interest adequately.' 9
An applicant fulfills Rule 24(a)(2)'s timeliness requirement when the
applicant files a motion to intervene in an action that the court considers
timely. 20 In determining whether an applicant's motion to intervene is timely,
courts consider the length of time that the applicant has had knowledge of
the action. 2' Courts also consider when the applicant realized that the action
would have some impact on the applicant's interests. 22 By considering when
an applicant knew of an action and the action's potential to harm the
applicant's interests, courts have great flexibility in determining when an
applicant's motion to intervene is timely. 23

16. FRED.R. Crv. P. 24(a). Rule 24(a) begins with the general requirement that an
applicant must file a timely motion to intervene. Id. The timeliness requirement of Rule 24(a)
applies to both Rule 24(a)(1) and Rule 24(a)(2). Id. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying
text (discussing relationship of timeliness requirement of Rule 24(a) to test set forth in Rule
24(a)(2)); infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing timeliness requirement of Rule
24(a)(2)).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(setting forth applicant's interest in action as second element of right to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2)).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 699 (setting forth impairment of
applicant's interests as element of test for determining applicant's right to intervene under
Rule 24(a)(2)).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 699 (setting forth inadequate
representation as element of test to determine applicant's right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)).
20. See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973) (holding that timeliness of
applicant's motion to intervene is matter entirely within discretion of court); Stotts v. Memphis
Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1982) (same).
21. See, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating
that courts should consider length of time applicant knew of action in evaluating timeliness
of applicant's motion to intervene); Michigan Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Smith, 657 F.2d
102, 105 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir.
1977) (same).
22. See, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating
that courts should consider when applicant knew action might harm applicant's interests in
evaluating applicant's motion to intervene); Michigan Ass'n. for Retarded Citizens v. Smith,
657 F.2d 102, 105 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264 (5th
Cir. 1977) (same).
23. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that
appellate court may only reverse district court's decision on applicant's motion to intervene
for abuse of discretion). District courts occasionally construe the timeliness requirement of
Rule 24(a) very broadly. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Co., Kansas, 84
F.R.D. 383, 405 (D. Kansas 1979) (construing timeliness requirement broadly). In Brown v.
Board of Educ., for example, an applicant moved to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in the
famous school desegregation case twenty four years after the last judicial decision in the case.
Id. at 386-89. The applicants, black parents and children enrolled in Topeka schools, alleged
that Topeka schools were still racially segregated, and that the named parties in the action
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The second part of the test for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) requires
an applicant to demonstrate an interest relating to the action.2 The applicant
must show one of three types of interests to meet the requirements of the
second part of the test.? First, an applicant may show a property interest
in the action. 26 Commentators recognize that courts consider a property
interest in the subject of the action to be the most obvious ground for an
applicant to intervene.2 7 Second, an applicant may show that the outcome
of the action might harm the applicant's legal interests.2 1 Some United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals hold that the second part of the four part
test requires the applicant to demonstrate a potentially independent claim
to intervene in the action. 29 Other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
consider any practical, legally protectable interest an applicant can demonstrate in the action sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the second part

could no longer represent adequately the applicant's interests in the action. Id. at 391. The
United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that the case had not yet been
resolved, and that the applicants had demonstrated an interest in the action. Id. at 392-405.
Further, the court held that the applicants' motion to intervene was timely. Id. at 398-404.
24. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2); see also Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3rd Cir.
1987) (stating that applicant's interest in action is second part of four part test under Rule
24(a)(2)); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-50 (same).
25. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussing three different types of
interests applicant may show to meet requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)). Commentators distinguish
between two general interests an applicant may show in an action; an interest in property that
is the subject of the action, or a legal interest in the action that the outcome of the action
would effect. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2 (distinguishing between property and
other interests an applicant may show to meet requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)). An applicant
may also intervene to protect the public's interests in an action. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text (discussing public's interests in action as third category of interest sufficient
to meet requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.0712], 24-55 to
24-56 (discussing applicant's interest in property in action as ground for intervention under
Rule 24(a)(2)); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing applicant's property interest in
action as ground for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)).
27. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.0712], 24-54 to 24-55 (stating that courts
generally consider applicant's property interest in action sufficient to meet interest requirement
of Rule 24(a)(2)). An applicant's property interest in an action is one of the oldest grounds
for establishing an applicant's right to intervene under Rule 24(a). See W. DAwSON, RULEs OF
Civa PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 52-54 (1938) (hereinafter,

W. DAwsoN (original version of Rule 24 stating that property interest in action is ground for
demonstrating applicant's right to intervene).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also Moona's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2], 24-57 to
24-62 (noting that courts recognize applicant's right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) when
applicant shows that outcome of action could harm applicant's legal interests).
29. See Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that applicant
must show direct, legally protectable interest equivalent to independent cause of action to
intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2)). United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 569
F.2d 277, 278-80 (5th Cir. 1978)(stating that applicant must demonstrate potentially independent
cause of action to meet interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp.,
427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1970 (same); infra note 54 (discussing direct, legally protectable
interest set forth in Wade v. Goldschmidt).
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of the test.30 Third, according to the decisions of some United States Circuit
Courts of appeals, an applicant's desire to represent the public's interests

in an action demonstrates an interest sufficient to fulfill the requirements
of the second part of the test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2).11
After an applicant has demonstrated an interest in an action, the
applicant must satisfy the third part of the test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)
by showing that the outcome of the action might harm the applicant's
interest.3 2 The applicant need not show that the outcome of the action will
bar the applicant from protecting an interest.33 Rule 24(a)(2) requires only

that the outcome of the action hinder the applicant's practical ability to
protect an interest.3 4 Some United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have
construed the third part of the test broadly to grant an applicant the right
to intervene when the outcome of the action might have a stare decisis
effect on the applicant's interests. 5 The United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, has taken a narrower view of the
third part of the test, and has required the applicant to show that the

outcome of the action might directly harm the applicant's interests in the
action.3
The fourth part of the test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) requires an applicant

to demonstrate that none of the parties in the action can represent adequately
30. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that courts may
consider practical effects of action on applicant's interests when evaluating applicant's motion
to intervene); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n.,
578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir.
1977) (stating that Rule 24(a)(2) does not require specific legal or equitable interest in action).
31. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting
applicant to intervene in action to protect public's interest in action); Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 463 F.2d 1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same).
32. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2); see Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987)
(stating that third part of Four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) requires applicant to show
that outcome of action could harm applicant's interest); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 24.07[l],
24-50 to 24-51 (same).
33. See Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980) (stating that Rule 24(a)(2) requires applicant to show practical, not legal impairment of
interest); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[3] (stating that Rule 24(a)(2) requires applicant
to show practical impairment of interest, not that outcome of action might bar applicant from
protecting interest).
34. See Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir.
1977) (stating that applicant has right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2) if outcome
of action might have practical effect on applicant's ability to protect interests); MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[3] (stating that Rule 24(a)(2) requires applicant to show only
practical, not legal harm to applicant's ability to protect interests to intervene in action).
35. See, e.g., Smith v. Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that stare
decisis effect of action represents sufficient impairment of interest to meet requirement of Rule
24(a)(2)); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir.
1967)(same).
36. See Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that stare
decisis effect of action not sufficient to meet impairment of interest requirement of Rule
24(a)(2)).
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the applicant's interests.3 7 The United States Supreme Court has held that
an applicant must make only a minimal showing that the parties in the
action might not represent adequately the applicant's interests to fulfill the
requirements of the fourth part of the test.38 An applicant may show that
the parties in the action cannot represent adequately the applicant's interests
if the parties' interests conflict with the applicant's interests.3 9 The applicant
also may show that the parties do not have the incentive to prosecute the
action vigorously. 4° Thus, an applicant may fulfill the fourth part of the
test by showing that the parties in the action do not have interests identical
41
to the applicant's interests.
HISTORY OF RuLE 24(a)(2)
The United State Supreme Court adopted the original version of Rule
24 in 1938.42 The original version of Rule 24(a) allowed an applicant to
37. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2); see Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987)
(stating that fourth part of test set forth under Rule 24(a)(2) requires applicant to show that
parties in action cannot represent adequately applicant's interests); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 24.07[21 (same).
38. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972). In Trbovich
v. United Mine Workers of America the United States Supreme Court considered the circumstances under which an applicant's interests are inadequately represented under Rule 24(a)(2).
Id. at 537-38. In Trbovich the Secretary of Labor sued the United Mineworkers Union alleging
improprieties in union election procedures. Id. at 529. The applicant, a member of the union
who filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor over the union's election procedures, sought
to intervene to urge the court to order specific changes in union election procedures. Id. at
529-30. In evaluating the applicant's motion to intervene, the Supreme Court held that although
an applicant carries the burden of showing that the parties in an action will not represent
adequately the applicant's interests in the action, an applicant need only make a minimal
showing that the parties might not represent adequately the applicant's interests. Id. at 538,
n. 10. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had made a minimal showing that the
Secretary of Labor might not represent adequately the applicant's interests, and held that the
applicant had a right to intervene in the action. Id. at 539
39. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(holding that interests of Environmental Protection Agency in pollution case conflicted with
interests of chemical companies); New Mexico v. Aamodt 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977) (holding that interests of indians in suit over water rights
might conflict with interests of United States government); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
24.07[4], 24-68 (stating that applicant may meet requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) by showing that
parties' interests conflict with applicant's interests).
40. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousmen's Union, 629 F.2d 1204
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding that party's failure to appeal order showed inadequate representation
of applicant's interests); County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that party's failure to vigorously argue applicant's position in action showed inadequate
representation); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[4] (stating that applicant may meet
requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) by showing that parties might not prosecute vigorously the
applicant's claim in an action).
41. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.0714], 24-71 (stating that applicant need only
show that applicant's interests differ from parties' interests to meet inadequate representation
requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)).
42. See W. DAwsoN, supra note 27 (original version of Rule 24 with Advisory Committee's Notes); id. at pp. iii-iv (recounting history of movement to adopt original version of
Rule 24(a)(2)).
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intervene when a judgment in an action would bind the applicant. 43 The

original rule also permitted an applicant to intervene when the applicant
claimed an interest in property in the court's custody. 44 Thus, the original
version of Rule 24(a) set forth narrower grounds for an applicant to
45
intervene than does the present Rule 24(a)(2).

In 1946 the United States Supreme Court revised Rule 24(a). 46 The
Supreme Court responded to commentators' and practitioners' criticisms of

the original rule by granting an applicant more latitude to intervene in an
action to protect the applicant's interests in property not in the custody of

the court. 4 Because the 1946 version of Rule 24(a) no longer required an

43. See id. at 52-54 (text of original Rule 24(a)). The original version of Rule 24(a)
adopted in 1938 consisted of three subparts. Id. As originally written, Rule 24(a)(1) set forth
an applicant's right to intervene in an action when a United States statute conferred an
absolute right to intervene. Id. Rule 24(a)(2) also set forth an applicant's right to intervene
when the parties in the action could not adequately represent the applicant's interests in the
action and the applicant might be bound by the outcome of the action. Id. Additionally, Rule
24(a)(3) set forth an applicant's right to intervene in an action when the applicant could
demonstrate an interest in property in the custody of the court. Id.
44. Id. (text of Rule 24(a)(3) as originally adopted). As originally written, Rule 24(a)(3)
required an applicant to demonstrate an interest in property in the custody of the court or of
an officer of the court to intervene in an action. Id. Rule 24(a)(3) also required an applicant
to demonstrate that any act by the court distributing or disposing of the property might harm
the applicant's interests in the property. Id.
45. Compare W. DAwsoN, supra note 27, at 52-54 (1938 version of Rule 24(a)(2) and
24(a)(3) requiring applicant's to demonstrate that outcome of action might bind applicant or
that applicant had interest in property in custody of court to show right tointervene in action)
with FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring applicant to show that outcome if action might harm
applicant's interests in action to demonstrate right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2)).
The original version of Rule 24(a)(2) simply codified the existing criteria courts used to grant
an applicant's request to intervene in an action. See W. DAwsoN, supra note 27, at 53 (stating
that Rule 24(a) did not change criteria for intervention).
46. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 F.R.D. 229, 235-36 (1946)
(reporting revision of Rule 24 by United States Supreme Court). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are amended pursuant to recommendations by the Advisory Committee. Id. 229.
The Advisory Committee reports recommendations to the Supreme Court. Id. The United
States Supreme Court then sends the proposed amendments to the Attorney General. 28
U.S.C.A. § 732c. The Attorney General then submits the proposed Amendments to Congress.
Id. Congress then approves the amendments, and the amendments take effect shortly thereafter.
Id.

47. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 352 (1946) (stating that recommended revision of
Rule 24(a) would broaden applicant's right to intervene to protect applicant's property interest
in action). The 1946 version of Rule 24(a) permitted an applicant to intervene to protect the
applicant's interest in property that would be distributed or disposed of by court order. See
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 F.R.D. 229, 235 (1946) (1946 version of
Rule 24(a)). The 1946 version of Rule 24(a) contained three subparts. Id. Rule 24(a)(1) set
forth an applicant's right to intervene in an action when a United States statute conferred an
absolute right to intervene. Id. Rule 24(a)(2) set forth an applicant's right to intervene in an
action when the applicant could demonstrate that the outcome of the action might bind the
applicant. Id. Rule 24(a)(3) set forth an applicant's right to intervene in an action when the
applicant could demonstrate an interest in property that the court had power to distribute by
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applicant to have an interest in property in the custody of the court, the
4
applicant could intervene in a greater number of actions. 1
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court again revised Rule 24(a) and
created the present version of Rule 24(a)(2). 49 The Supreme Court significantly expanded the rule, responding to the practice among lower federal
courts of broadly construing the property interest requirement of the 1946
version of Rule 24 to permit more applicants to intervene. 0 The 1966 version
of Rule 24(a)(2) grants an applicant the right to intervene in any action in
which the applicant can show an interest that the outcome of the action
might harm." Because the 1966 version of Rule 24(a)(2) no longer requires
an applicant to show that the outcome of the action would bind the
applicant, the 1966 version of Rule 24(a)(2) expands an applicant's right to
intervene in an action. 52 Some courts have responded to the 1966 revision
of Rule 24(a)(2) by finding that an applicant now has a right to intervene
in an action to defend a wide variety of interests, including the public's
53
interest.
court order. Id. The 1946 version of Rule 24(a) altered only subpart (3) of the rule. Compare
id. (1946 version of Rule 24(a)) with W. DAwsoN, supra note 27, at 52 (original version of
Rule 24(a)).
48. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 352 (1946) (stating that revisions of Rule 24(a)(3)
adopted in 1946 would broaden applicant's right to intervene in an action to protect the
applicant's property interest in the action).
49. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-111 (1966) (1966
amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The 1966 revision of Rule 24(a)(2) altered
Rule 24(a) in two important respects. Id. (revised text of Rule 24(a) and Advisory Committee's
Note discussing changes in Rule 24(a)). First, the 1966 revision of Rule 24(a) merged subparts
(2) and (3) into an single subpart, subpart (2). Id. Second, the 1966 revision of Rule 24(a)
significantly expanded an applicant's non-statutory right to intervene in an action. Id.
In 1987 the Supreme Court again revised Rule 24(a)(2). See Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 113 F.R.D. 189, 211 (1987) (revisions of Rule 24(a)(2)). The 1987 revisions replace
the pronoun "he" in the 1966 version of the rule with the phrase "the applicant" in two
places. Id. These changes do not alter the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) in any way. Id.
50. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 113 F.R.D. 189, 211 (1987) (Advisory Committee's Notes stating that lower federal courts tended to construe Rule 24(a) broadly). In the
Note on the 1966 revision of Rule 24(a)(2), the Advisory Committee stated that federal courts
had adopted a practice of construing the language of Rule 24(a)(3) as written in 1946 so
broadly that the language had become meaningless. Id. According to the Advisory Committee,
federal courts could construe Rule 24(a)(3) to grant an applicant the right to intervene in
almost any action. Id. The Advisory Committee stated that the federal courts construed Rule'
24(a)(3) broadly because the rule unnecessarily restricted an applicant's right to intervene in
an action. Id. Thus, the Advisory Committee stated that Rule 24(a) needed to be revised. Id.
51. Id.; see MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[l], 24-50 to 24-51 (stating that 1966
revision of Rule 24(a)(2) grants applicant right to intervene in any action in which applicant
can demonstrate interest that outcome of action might harm).
52. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Notes explaining that 1966 revision of Rule 24(a)(2) broadens applicant's
right to intervene in action); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.0711] (explaining how 1966
revision of Rule 24(a)(2) broadens applicant's right to intervene in action).
53. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2] nn. 4-21 (discussing various interests that
courts have held to meet requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)); supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text (discussing interest applicant must show in action under Rule 24(a)(2)).
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Applicants seeking to intervene to protect the public's interests in an
action fall into two categories. 5 4 The first category consists of public interest
lobbying groups and other groups that seek to influence public policy
through the legislative and judicial processes. 5 The second category consists
of government entities and government officials that seek to represent the
public's interest in an action.5
Courts often must decide whether an applicant has a right to intervene
to represent the public's interest in an action when a public interest group
seeks to intervene in an action. 1 Public interest groups often seek to
54. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing categories of applicants
seeking to intervene to represent public's interest). Applicants seeking to intervene in an action
under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the public's interest in the action fall into two major categories,
public interest groups and government entities. Id. The applicant in Wade v. Goldschmidt
represents a third, less important category, individuals seeking to represent the public's interest.
Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982). In Wade a private citizen attempted to
intervene in the action to represent the public's interests in the action. Id, at 183-4. The
plaintiffs in Wade sought to prevent the State of Illinois from constructing a bridge across
the Illinois River at the site that the state intended to use for the project. Id. The plaintiffs,
owners of land that the State of Illinois intended to condemn for the bridge, alleged that the
planners of the project had failed to make the required environmental impact studies, that the
project did not meet the statutory criteria for federal funding, and that the project would
destroy a farm that was eligible to be included on the National Register of Historic Places.
Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs sought to prevent the State of Illinois from building the bridge.
Id. The applicants, private citizens and several Illinois municipalities who favored building the
proposed bridge project at the proposed site, asserted a right to intervene in the project under
Rule 24(a)(2) to defend the Bridge project. Id.
In considering the applicant's motion to intervene, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit stated that the applicants must meet the requirements of the four part
test set forth under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 185. The Second Circuit considered only the second
part of the four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2), the requirement that an applicant
demonstrate an interest in an action to intervene. Id. The Second Circuit stated that Rule
24(a)(2) requires an applicant to demonstrate a direct, significant, legally protectable interest
in an action to intervene. Id. The Second Circuit held that the applicants could not demonstrate
a direct, significant legally protectable interest in the action. Id. at 185-86. Therefore, the
Second Circuit rejected the applicant's motion to intervene. Id. Because no other United States
Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a private citizen's right to intervene in an action
under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests in the action, this note will not address
the topic of a private citizen's right to intervene to protect the public's interests.
55. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Audubon society seeking to intervene to protect land designated as bird sanctuary); Washington
State Bldg. and Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1982) (anti-toxic
waste lobbying group seeking to intervene in action over legality of waste dump in Washington);
Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980) (National Organization for Women
seeking to intervene in action challenging procedure for ratifying Equal Rights Amendment).
56. See Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (California Commissioner of
Corporations seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in class action alleging violations of
securities laws).
57. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (public interest
group seeking to intervene to represent public interest); Washington State Building & Constr.
Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886

(9th Cir. 1980) (same).
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intervene in an action to defend a piece of legislation or an administrative
decision consistent with the group's objectives. 8 In these cases, the public
interest group seeking to intervene generally cannot show a property interest
in the action. 59 Similarly, public interest groups rarely are able to show that
the outcome of the action could harm legally protectable interests unique
to the public interest group. 60 Nonetheless, these groups contend that they

have a right to intervene in an action to represent the public's interests in
the action. 61
In Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt 62 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a public
interest group has the right under Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene in an action
to defend an administrative decision that the group supports. 63 In Sagebrush
Rebellion the plaintiff, Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., challenged a decision by
the Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, creating a wildlife refuge for
birds. 64 Sagebrush Rebellion, which had lobbied against the bird sanctuary,
claimed that the bird sanctuary did not represent the most equitable use of
the land and sought to have the Secretary's decision overturned. 65 The
Audubon Society had lobbied the Department of the Interior to create the

bird sanctuary." The Audubon Society, describing itself as a non-profit

58. See supra note 55 (listing cases in which public interest groups sought to intervene
to defend legislation or court decision favored by group).
59. See id. (listing cases in which public interest groups seek to intervene in action under
Rule 24(a)(2) to represent public's interest in action and assert no property interest in action).
60. See id. (listing cases in which public interest groups seek to intervene in action under
Rule 24(a)(2) to represent public's interests in action and do not allege that outcome of action
might harm interest unique to group).
61. See id. (listing cases in which applicants assert right to intervene in action under
Rule 24(a)(2) to protect public's interests in action).
62. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
63. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1983). In Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt the Audubon society sought to intervene to defend an order by the
Secretary of the Interior to set aside land in Idaho as a refuge for birds. Id. at 526. The
Audubon Society described itself as a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting wildlife.
Id. The Audubon Society sought to intervene in the action to defend a particular public policy,
the Secretary's decision creating a wildlife refuge. Id. Therefore, the Society sought to intervene
to represent the public's interest in the action. See supra note 11 (defining "public interest").
64. Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 526-27. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. was a non-profit
organization formed to promote a multiple use style of land management. Id. Sagebrush
Rebellion challenged Secretary Andrus' decision creating the Snake River Birds of Prey National
Conservation Area. Id. Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus had created the conservation
area by withdrawing 500,000 acres of land from a federal program designed to promote private
development of desert lands. Id. Sagebrush Rebellion sued the Secretary of the Interior alleging
that the Secretary's actions were illegal. Id.
65. Id. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. had lobbied against creating the Snake River Birds of
Prey National Conservation Area. Id. Sagebrush Rebellion had argued that the Secretary of
the Interior should adopt alternative uses for the land. Id. When the Secretary designated the
land as a conservation area, Sagebrush Rebellion sued, alleging that the Secretary had acted
illegally. Id.
66. Id. at 527. In Sagebrush Rebellion v. Watt the United States Court of Appeals for
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organization for the protection of wildlife, claimed an interest in the action

and sought to intervene.67
In considering whether the Audubon Society could intervene under Rule

24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit stated that it previously had allowed public
interest groups to intervene in actions that challenged the legality of measures

that the group had supported." The Ninth Circuit stated that to intervene

the Ninth Circuit stated that both the Audubon Society and Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. had
actively lobbied the Secretary of the Interior over the Snake River Birds of Prey National
Conservation Area. Id.
67. Id. at 526-28. Sagebrush Rebellion was the Audubon Society's appeal from an order
by a federal district court denying the Society's motion to intervene. Id. The district court
held that the Audubon Society could demonstrate no interest in the land set aside for the
conservation area, and that the Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, would represent
adequately the Society's interests in the action. Id.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referred to the
applicants in Sagebrush Rebellion as the Audubon Society, the applicants consisted of a
coalition of 15 separate groups. Id. Because all of the applicants retained the same counsel
and asserted a common interest in the action, the Ninth Circuit treated all of the groups as a
single applicant. Id.
68. Id. at 527. In Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit cited two earlier Ninth Circuit decisions for the proposition that a public
interest lobbying group has a right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2) to defend
products of the group's efforts. Id.; see Washington State Bldg. and Constr. Trades v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that public interest group has right to intervene
under Rule 24(a)(2) to defend public policy favored by group); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). In Washington State Building and Construction Trades v. Spellman
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a public interest group that had sponsored a ballot
initiative had a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in an action challenging the initiative.
Washington State, 684 F.2d at 629. The applicants in Washington State, a public interest
group called "Don't Waste Washington" (D.W.W.), had sponsored a ballot initiative in
Washington to prevent out of state producers of radioactive waste from using waste dumps
inside Washington State. Id. Washington voters passed the initiative, and the United States
and several other plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the initiative unconstitutionally restricted
interstate commerce. Id. at 629-32. D.W.W. asserted a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
to defend the constitutionality of the initiative. Id.
In Considering D.W.W.'s right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit stated
that courts traditionally construe Rule 24 liberally in favor of an applicant's right to intervene
in an action. Id. Further, because D.W.W. had sponsored the initiative that was the subject
of the action, the Ninth Circuit held that D.W.W. had a right to intervene in the action under
Rule 24(a)(2). Id. The Ninth Circuit then held that D.W.W.'s right to intervene did not affect
the outcome of the action and struck down the initiative as unconstitutional. Id.
Similarly, in Idaho v. Freeman the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered whether a public interest lobbying group has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
to defend a public policy favored by the group. Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th
Cir. 1980). In Idaho v. Freeman State legislators from Arizona and Idaho sued the General
Services Administration, alleging that the ratification procedures for the Equal Rights Amendment were improper. Id. The National Organization For Women asserted a right to intervene
in the action under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
In considering the National Organization for Women's motion to intervene, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the Organization must meet the requirements of the four part test set forth
under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.; see supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing four part
test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)). The Ninth Circuit held that the Organization had demonstrated
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the Audubon Society must meet the four part test of Rule 24(a)(2) by filing
a timely motion to intervene, demonstrating an interest in the action,
showing that the interest might be harmed by the outcome of the action,
and showing that none of the parties in the action adequately would
represent the interest. 69 The Ninth Circuit held that the Audubon Society

had filed a timely motion to intervene. 70 The Ninth Circuit also stated that
the Audubon Society clearly had an interest in the action because the group
had supported the Snake River Wildlife Refuge. 7' The Ninth Circuit found
that a decision in favor of the plaintiff could harm the Society's interests
in the action. 72 Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government
73
might not adequately protect the Audubon Society's interest in the action.
Because the Audubon Society met the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), the
Ninth Circuit held that the Audubon Society had a right to intervene to

defend the wildlife sanctuary against the challenge by Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc.74 Sagebrush Rebellion demonstrates that courts may allow a public
interest group to intervene in an action to defend the product of the group's
efforts when the group complies with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) of

75
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
permitted public interest groups to intervene in an action to represent the
public's interests, other circuits have declined to recognize a right for an
applicant to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests

the interest in the action required by Rule 24(a)(2). Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d at 887.
Further, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Organization had demonstrated that the outcome of
the action might harm the Organization's interests in the action. Id. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit held that the National Organization for Women had a right to intervene in the action
under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
69. Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 527; see supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text
(discussing four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)).
70. Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 527.
71. Id. at 527-28; see supra note 68 (discussing cases in Ninth Circuit supporting public
interest group's right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect public's interest in
action).
72. Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 527-28.
73. Id. at 528-29. In Sagebrush Rebellion the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant in
the action, Secretary of the Interior James Watt, might not represent adequately the applicant's
interests in the action. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that Secretary Watt had not made the
decision that the plaintiffs in the action challenged. Id. Watt's predecessor, Cecil Andrus,
made the decision that the plaintiffs challenged. Id. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Secretary Watt had headed the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the organization representing
the plaintiffs in the action, prior to his appointment as Secretary of the Interior. Id. in
addition, the Ninth Circuit explained that the applicants possessed specialized knowledge of
the issues in the case not available to the parties. Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that
the parties in the action might not represent adequately the applicant's interests in the action.
Id.
74. See id. at 529 (holding that Audubon society had right to intervene in action under
Rule 24(a)(2)).
75. See id. at 527-28 (stating that public interest group has right to intervene to protect
product of group's efforts).
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in an action. 76 Courts rejecting an applicant's right to intervene to protect
the public's interests in an action construe the interest requirement of Rule
24(a)(2) narrowly. 77 These courts hold that an applicant must show a
connection to an action stronger than a desire to represent the public interest
to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) .7 The second part of the four part test set
forth under Rule 24(a)(2), according to these courts, requires the applicant
to show a direct interest in the action. 79 Therefore, these courts reject
arguments that an applicant has a right to intervene in an action to represent
the public's interest. 0
For example, in Keith v. Daley"' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit considered whether a public interest lobbying group
could intervene in an action to defend a statute for which the group had
lobbied. 82 In 1984, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a law regulating
abortions."3 The plaintiffs, doctors in Illinois who wanted to perform
abortions, challenged the statute, arguing that the statute violated a woman's
4
constitutional right of privacy and the doctors' right to practice medicine.
The applicants, the Illinois Pro-Life Coalition, had lobbied the Illinois

76. See infra notes 81-114 and accompanying text (discussing decisions rejecting public
interest group's right to intervene to represent public's interests in action).
77. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir. 1985)(rejecting applicant's motion
to intervene in action to represent public's interest). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has held that an applicant must show a direct, significant and legally
protectable interest in an action to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 1268.
In practice, the Seventh Circuit's test for an applicant's interest excludes applicants who would
probably have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in the Ninth Circuit. Compare Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting applicant's motion to intervene
under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect public's interest in action) with Keith, 764 F.2d at 1272 (rejecting
applicant's motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent Public's interests in action);
infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing Keith).
78. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268 (holding that applicant must show direct, significant
and legally protectable interest in action to meet requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)); infra note 92
(discussing direct, significant and legally protectable interest standard); supra note 54 (same).
79. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268 (holding that applicant must show direct, significant
and legally protectable interest in action to meet requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)); supra note 54
(discussing direct, significant and legally protectable standard as set forth in Wade v. Goldschmidt).
80. See infra, notes 81-138 and accompanying text (discussing cases rejecting applicants'
right to intervene to represent public interest).
81. 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 1267. In 1984 the Illinois General Assembly amended Illinois' abortion statute.
Id. The 1984 amendments to the statute required doctors to consider the life of a fetus more
important than the life of the mother, to attempt to save the lives of non-viable fetuses and
to inform the mother about possible pain that the fetus would experience. Id. The amendments
to the statute also declared that conception marks the beginning of human life and subjected
doctors to possible homicide prosecutions for aborting non-viable fetuses. Id.
84. Id. at 1267. The plaintiffs in Keith contended that some provisions of the Illinois
statute were identical to provisions in an earlier Illinois statute held unconstitutional. Id.; see
Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 452, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding Illinois abortion statute unconstitutional).
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General Assembly to pass the abortion statute." The applicants claimed

that the lobbying efforts created an interest in the action and sought to
intervene as defendants in the action to defend the constitutionality of the
s6
statute.

In reviewing the Illinois Pro-Life Coalition's motion to intervene, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the Coalition must satisfy the four part test set
forth in Rule 24(a)(2).17 The Seventh Circuit held that the Coalition had
the burden of showing that the motion to intervene met the requirements
of the four part test.8 The Seventh Circuit addressed only the second part

of the four part test, the question of whether the Coalition could show an
interest in the action.

9

The Seventh Circuit explained that an applicant

must show a direct, significant, and legally protectable interest in an action
to intervene. 90 The Seventh Circuit held that the Coalition failed to meet
the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) for two reasons.9' First, the Seventh
Circuit held that the Coalition's lobbying efforts in favor of the abortion
statute did not create a direct, legally protectable interest in the action. 92
Second, the Seventh Circuit stated that the Coalition could not be a
defendant in the action.93 Because the plaintiffs sought to prevent the State
of Illinois from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional statute, the Seventh
85. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1267. In Keith, the applicants, Illinois Pro-Life Coalition (I.P.C.),
asserted an interest in the action because the group had lobbied for laws setting forth alternatives
to abortion. Id. I.P.C. had lobbied for the law challenged by the plaintiffs in Keith, had
actively promoted alternatives to abortion, and had volunteered to adopt unwanted fetuses.
Id.
86. Id. Counsel for I.P.C. in Keith asserted that I.P.C. had a right to intervene in the
action under Rule 24(a)(2) because the counsel's extensive experience in abortion litigation
created an interest in the action. Id. at 1268. The district court rejected I.P.C.'s request to
intervene in the action, but granted I.P.C. the right to file an amicus curiae brief. Id.
87. Id. at 1268; see supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing four part test
set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)).
88. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268. In Keith the Seventh Circuit stated that an applicant bears
the burden of showing that the applicant's motion to intervene meets all the requirements set
forth in Rule 24(a)(2). Id. Should the applicant fail to meet any one of the requirements set
forth in Rule 24(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit explained, the court must deny the applicant's
motion to intervene. Id.
89. Id. In Keith the Seventh Circuit discussed only the second part of the four part test
set forth in Rule 24(a)(2). Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the parties in the dction conceded
the timeliness of the applicant's motion to intervene. Id.
90. Id. at 1268; see supra note 78 (discussing direct, significant legally protectable interest
requirement in Seventh Circuit).
91. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268-72.
92. Id. at 1269. In Keith the United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected the applicant's argument that courts should construe the interest requirement of Rule
24(a)(2) broadly in public law cases. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that Rule 24(a)(2) requires
all applicants to demonstrate a direct, significant legally protectable interest in an action to
intervene. Id. The Seventh Circuit explained that even though the applicant in Keith existed
as an entity solely for the purpose of changing public policy on abortion, the applicant's
activities in favor of the Illinois abortion statute did not create an interest meeting the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
93. Id.
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Circuit stated that only officials of the State of Illinois charged with

enforcing the statute could be defendants in the action.9 4 Because the
Coalition could not enforce the statute, the Seventh Circuit held, the
Coalition could not be a defendant in the action and had no interest in the
action sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). 95 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Pro-Life Coalition had no right under
96
Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene in the actionl.
In Sagebrush Rebellion and Keith public interest lobbying groups as-

serted a right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the
public's interests in the action. 97 In another case a union asserted a similar

right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the public's
interest in an action. 9 In Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election
Commission" the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

considered whether a union has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in
an action by a corporation challenging Federal Election Commission limits

on corporate political donations. 10° Athens Lumber Company's (Athens
Lumber) shareholders had passed a resolution authorizing the use of corporate funds for political purposes. 01' Because the Federal Election Commission regulations prohibited corporations from making political
expenditures, Athens Lumber challenged the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Commission's regulations.Ire The applicants, the International As-

sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union), subsequently

94. Id. at 1269-70. The Seventh Circuit stated that only the Illinois Attorney General
and the Cook County State's Attorney had the authority to enforce the statute. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. at 1272. In Keith the Seventh Circuit noted that I.P.C. existed primarily to
influence and convince legislators and members of the public that public policy on abortion
in the United States is wrong. Id. at 1270. The Seventh Circuit stated that I.P.C. was free,
and in fact was encouraged to speak out on the issue of abortion and attempt to convince
the world of the correctness of I.P.C.'s views. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the I.P.C.'s
freedom to express its views on abortion did not create a right for I.P.C. to intervene in every
action touching on the abortion issue. Id. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit rejected I.P.C.'s
motion to intervene. Id.
97. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text (discussing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc.

v. Watt); notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing Keith v. Daley).
98. See Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982)
(union asserting right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect public's interest in
action).
99. 690 F.2d 1364 (l1th Cir. 1982).
100. Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1365 (lth Cir.
1982).
101. Id. at 1365. Athens Lumber's stockholders passed a unanimous resolution giving the
company's president the power to spend corporate funds for political purposes. Id.
102. Id. The contributions authorized by Athens Lumber's shareholders clearly violated
Federal Election Commission's regulations. Id. The shareholder's resolution authorized the
company's president to make political expenditures on the condition that the corporation
obtain a judgment declaring the regulations unconstitutional. Id. Athens Lumber therefore
challenged the Federal Election Commission's regulations as unconstitutional. Id.
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sought to intervene.10 3 The Union asserted that it had an interest in protecting

the Federal Election Commission's regulations because by limiting the
amount of money corporations could spend for political purposes, the
regulations helped to protect unions' political influence and, hence, the
fairness of the political process.' °4

In addressing the Union's motion to intervene, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the Union must meet the four part test set forth in Rule
24(a)(2).' 0 5 The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the interest requirement of
the four part test.'10 The Eleventh Circuit explained that to have a right to

intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), an applicant must demonstrate an important,
legally protectable interest in an action.' °7 The Eleventh Circuit further
explained that the interest must be equivalent to that of a party to the

transaction in question in the action.10 Although the Eleventh Circuit
acknowleged the Union's concern that the outcome of the action could
result in the decline of the Union's political influence, the court stated that
the union possessed no interest in the action not shared by the public at
large. 1°9 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Union's interest in

the action was too general to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).1 0
In addressing the Union's motion to intervene, the Eleventh Circuit also
considered the inadequate representation requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)." 1
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the union and the Federal Election Com-

103. Id. In Athens Lumber the shareholders of Athens Lumber, Inc. authorized the
company to sue the Federal Election Commission (F.E.C.), alleging that F.E.C. regulations
prohibiting corporate expenditures for political purposes were unconstitutional. Id. The applicant, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (I.A.M.), moved to
intervene in the action, asserting an interest under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. The district court denied
I.A.M.'s motion to intervene and dismissed Athens Lumber's case for lack of justiciability.
Id. Athens Lumber and I.A.M. then appealed the district court's decisions separately. Id.
104. Id. The I.A.M. argued that the outcome of Athens Lumber could harm unions'
political influence if the F.E.C. lost and could no longer restrict corporate political expenditures.
Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that I.A.M. considered its interest in the action to be private,
but the Seventh Circuit disagreed, characterizing the I.A.M.'s interest in the action as identical
to the interest of the public at large. .d. at 1365-66.
105. Id. at 1366; see supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing four part test
set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)).
106. Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1366. The Seventh Circuit stated that the timeliness of
the applicant's motion to intervene was not an issue in the case. Id. at 1366 n. 2.
107. Id. at 1366, 1366 n. 2. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the union had reason to
be concerned over the outcome of the action, but stated that the union's concern over the
possible decline in its political influence did not create a sufficient interest in the action to
meet the requirement set forth in Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that I.A.M. could not enforce the Federal Election
Commission regulations against Athens Lumber. Id. Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
I.A.M. had no connection with Athens Lumber. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the only
interest I.A.M. could demonstrate in the action was the same interest shared by every member
of society, an interest in assuring that corporations do not unduly influence elections. Id.
110. Id. at 1366.
111. Id. at 1366-67.
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mission both sought to uphold the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Commission regulations." 2 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
the Federal Election Commission had a duty to represent the interests of
members of the public such as the Union, and thus adequately represented
the Union's interests in the action." 3 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
4
denied the Union's application to intervene."
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

In Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Commission 5 the
Eleventh Circuit stated that the applicant could not intervene because the
Federal Election Commission adequately represented the public's interests
in the action." 6 The Federal Election Commission was the original defendant
in Athens Lumber." 7 Because the Federal Election Commission was a party
to the original action, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider whether the
Federal Election Commission had a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
to represent the public's interests in the action." 8 Occasionally, however,
government entities or officials seek to intervene in an action under Rule
24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests in the action." 9

112. Id. at 1366.
113. Id. In Athens Lumber the applicants also asserted that the United States Supreme
Court decision in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America supported the applicant's
right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.; Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404
U.S. 528 (1972). In Trbovich the Secretary of Labor brought an action against the United
Mine Workers of America for misconduct in union elections. Id. at 529. The union member
who had filed the complaint on which the Secretary of Labor had based his action sought to
intervene in the action under Rule 24(a)(2) to argue for specific safeguards in a new election.
Id. at 529-30. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had satisfied the interest requirement
of Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 538. In considering whether the parties adequately represented the
applicant's interests, the Supreme Court found that the Secretary of Labor had two duties in
the action. Id. at 539. First, the Secretary had a duty to represent the interests of members
of the union. Id. Second, the Secretary had a duty to represent the public's interest in the
action. Id. Because the Secretary's duties were related but not identical, the Supreme Court
held that the Secretary might not represent adequately the union member's interests in the
action. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the union member had a right to intervene
in the action under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. In Athens Lumber the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Federal Election Commission had precisely the same interest in the action as that asserted by
the applicant, and, thus, that Trbovich did not support the applicant's motion to intervene.
Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1366-67.
114. Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1367.
115. 690 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
116. Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (1Ith Cir.
1982).
117. Id. at 1365; see supra note 103 (discussing history of Athens Lumber suit)
118. See Athens Lumber, 690 F.2d at 1365-67 (discussing applicant's motion to intervene).
119. See Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1982)(local and county
government entities asserting right to intervene in action to protect public's interests in action);
Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1977)(government official asserting right to
intervene in action to protect public's interests in action); supra note 54 (discussing Wade v.
Goldschmidt).
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For example, in Blake v. Pallan20 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a state official has a right under
Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene in a federal action to protect the public's interest
in the action. 2 1 In Blake investors in a land development scheme filed a
class action lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the organizers of the
scheme had violated federal securities laws.' 2 The investors based their
federal class action suit on the same transactions as two actions filed in
California state court alleging that the defendants had violated California
securities laws.'2 The California Commissioner of Corporations sought to
intervene in the federal class action suit under Rule 24(a)(2).1 4 The Commissioner asserted four interests in the action. 12 First, the Commissioner
argued that the outcome of the federal action might alter the California
securities laws that the Commissioner was charged with enforcing.' 6 Second,
the Commissioner argued that the action created novel questions of California securities law and that the Commissioner had a right to intervene to
argue for a proper interpretation of the California laws. 127 Third, the
120. 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.1977).
121. Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 950. In Blake v. Pallan the defendants had sold the plaintiffs interests in
limited partnerships to develop land near several small airports. Id. The Investors filed a class
action suit in federal court naming six promoters and 52 salesmen as defendants. Id. The
plaintiff's complaint set forth two causes of action based on federal securities law and three
additional counts based on California securities and fraud laws. Id. After the plaintiffs increased
the size of the plaintiff class and dropped some defendants from the suit, the district court
certified the class. Id. at 951.
123. Id. at 950. The federal class action filed by the plaintiffs in Blake v. Pallan was
closely tied to two actions in California state courts. Id. The California Commissioner of
Corporations filed the first of these actions, alleging that the defendants had violated California
corporate securities laws. Id. Investors in the land development scheme then filed a class action
against the defendants. Id. The California court consolidated the Commissioner's suit and the
state class action. Id. at n. 2.
124. Id. at 951. In Blake v. Pallan the Commissioner moved to intervene in the Federal
action under both Rule 24(a) and 24(b) and filed a proposed complaint. Id. The district court
granted the Commissioners motion to intervene. Id. The Commissioner then filed a complaint
containing three causes of action based on California law. Id. Some of the defendants moved
to dismiss the Commissioner's complaint, and the district court modified its order to indicate
that the Commissioner had intervened permissively under Rule 24(b). Id. The district court
then dismissed the Commissioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The Commissioner
appealed the district court's order. Id.
125. Id. at 952-53.
126. Id. at 952. In Blake v. Pallan the Commissioner moved to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2) asserting that he had an interest in the federal courts' interpretation of federal securities
law because much of California securities law incorporates federal securities law and often
refers to federal laws. Id. The Commissioner did not argue that a decision in federal court
would directly affect California securities law, but rather suggested that the federal decision
would indirectly affect California securities law. Id.
127. Id. at 953. In Blake v. Pallan the Ninth Circuit explained that the California
Commissioner of Corporations would have an interest in the action under Rule 24(a)(2) if the
outcome of the action affected the Commissioner's duties under California law. Id. The Ninth
Circuit stated, however, that the simple fact that the district court hearing the Blake case
would interpret California law to decide the action did not create a sufficient interest for the
Commissioner to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
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Commissioner claimed an economic interest in the action because the
Commissioner could sue defendants in securities cases for restitution under
California securities law) 28 Finally, the commissioner asserted a right to
intervene to protect the public's interests in the action.

29

In considering the Commissioner's motion to intervene the Ninth Circuit
stated that the Commissioner must meet the four part test set forth in Rule

24(a)(2).130 The Ninth Circuit considered the interest requirement of the four
part test most extensively.'' The Ninth Circuit held that the effect the

federal action might have on California securities law did not give the
Commissioner an interest in the action under Rule 24(a)(2).1 32 The Ninth
Circuit also held that the California securities law claims asserted by the
plaintiffs in the federal action did not give the Commissioner an interest in
the action. 33 The Ninth Circuit held further that the Commissioner had no

128. Id. In Blake v. Pallan the California Commissioner of Corporations asserted that
California law gave the Commissioner the power to sue for restitution on behalf of victims
of California securities laws violators. Id. The Commissioner asserted that this power met the
interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
129. Id. In Blake v. Pallan the Ninth Circuit noted that several commentators have
advocated government intervention in the public interest. Id.; see Shapiro, Some Thoughts on
Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HAv. L. REv. 721, 734-36 (1968)

(advocating right of government to intervene to protect public's interests in action). One
commentator cited by the Ninth Circuit contends that courts should recognize the government's
right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests in the
action for two reasons. Id. First, the commentator argues that lawsuits often affect persons
who are unable adequately to represent themselves. Id. Second, the commentator argues that
courts should recognize the government's right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2)
to represent the public's interest in an action to enable the court to hear arguments that the
parties to the action would not advance. Id. The commentator contends that courts therefore
should recognize the government's right to intervene in an action to represent the interests of
persons unable to represent their own interests. Id.
130. Blake, 554 F.2d at 951; see supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing
four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2)). In Blake the Ninth Circuit stated that none of the
parties contested the timeliness of the Commissioner's motion to intervene. Blake, 554 F.2d
at 951-52. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the Commissioner had met the timeliness
requirement set forth in Rule 24(a). Id.
131. Blake, 554 F.2d at 952-53; see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing
interest requirement of four part test set forth under Rule 24(a)(2)).
132. Blake, 554 F.2d at 952-53; see supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing
Commissioner's assertion that outcome of federal action might alter California securities laws).
In Blake the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument that the outcome of the
federal securities action might affect California securities law. Blake, 554 F.2d at 952-53. The
Ninth Circuit explained that federal securities laws and California securities laws are separate
bodies of law, and that a decision in federal court construing federal securities law would not
affect California securities law sufficiently to give the Commissioner an interest in the action
under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
133. Blake, 554 F.2d at 953; see supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing
Commissioner's argument that Commissioner had right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) to
argue for proper interpretation of California securities law). In Blake v. Pallan the Ninth
Circuit stated that the California Commissioner of Corporations could not demonstrate an
interest in an action simply because the outcome of the action would require the court to
interpret California securities law. Blake, 554 F.2d at 953. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the
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economic interest in the action. 3 4 The Ninth Circuit found the Commis-

sioner's assertion of a right to intervene to represent the public's interests
in the action appealing, but held that the public's interest in the action did

not create a practical ground for recognizing the Commissioner's right to
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).13 1 Because the Commissioner had not shown
sufficient interest in the action to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),
the Ninth Circuit held that the outcome of the action could not impair the
Commissioner's interests. 36 Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs in the action would represent adequately the Commissioner's interests
in the action. 37 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied the Commissioner's
motion to intervene.1ss
ANALYsis oF RuILE 24(a)(2)
Although all courts considering whether an applicant has a right to
intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect the public's interests
in the action apply the same four part test, the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals disagree in interpreting the interest requirement of the test. 3 9
Several Circuit Courts have stated that courts cannot define precisely the
interest that Rule 24(a)(2) requires an applicant to demonstrate. 140 These

Commissioner's argument, stating that the Commissioner could protect any interest in the
action through permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) or an amicus curiae brief. Id.
134. Blake, 554 F.2d at 953; see supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing
Commissioner's assertion that Commissioner had economic interest in action). The Ninth
Circuit stated that the Commissioner could protect any economic interest the Commissioner
might show in the action in California state court. Blake, 554 F.2d at 953; see supra note 123
and accompanying text (discussing action filed by Commissioner in California state court
against defendants in Blake).
135. Id. at 953; see supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Commissioner's
argument that Commissioner had right to intervene in action under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect
public interest). The Ninth Circuit stated that the Commissioner could represent the public's
interest in the action in state court. Blake, 554 F.2d at 953; see supra note 123 and accompanying
text (discussing action filed by Commissioner in state court). Further, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the Commissioner's desire to represent the public's interest in the action did not represent
a practical ground for finding an interest under Rule 24(a)(2). Blake, 554 F.2d at 953.
136. Blake, 554 F.2d at 954. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Commissioner had recourse
to California state courts to represent any interest the Commissioner might demonstrate in the
action. Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that the stare decisis effect of the outcome of the
federal action would not impair the Commissioner's ability to protect any interest in the action.
Id.; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing impairment of interest under
Rule 24(a)(2) through stare decisis effect of action).
137. Blake, 554 F.2d at 954-55. In Blake v. Pallan the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
in the federal action represented precisely the same interests that the Commissioner asserted
in the action. Id.
138. Id. at 955.
139. See supra notes 62-138 and accompanying text (discussing different interpretations
of interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)).
140. See, e.g., Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that courts
have not established clearly what constitutes interest under Rule 24(a)(2)); Rosebud Coal Sales
Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th
Cir. 1977) (same); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[2], 24-57 (same).
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courts explain that the United States Supreme Court intentionally drafted
the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) vaguely to allow as many applicants

as possible to intervene.' 4' These Circuit Courts explain that the rule must
42
contain some ambiguity, or courts cannot construe the rule broadly.
As originally drafted, Rule 24(a) allowed only applicants with narrow
interests directly related to an action to intervene in the action. 43 In 1946,
and again in 1966, the Supreme Court responded to calls to broaden an
applicant's right to intervene in an action by revising Rule 24(a).1" Both of
the Supreme Court's revisions of Rule 24(a)(2) broadened the rule's interest
requirement to give applicants demonstrating interests less closely tied to an
action the right to intervene in the action. 4 Each time the Supreme Court

broadened the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2), however, the precise
interest an applicant had to demonstrate to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
became less clear. 46 The 1966 version of Rule 24(a)(2), therefore, permits
a court to interpret the rule's interest requirement very broadly. 47
Factors other than the history of Rule 24(a)(2) encourage courts to

construe the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) broadly. 48 Two policies
underlying Rule 24(a)(2) show that the Supreme Court intended for courts
49
to construe the rule to permit as many applicants as possible to intervene.
First, according to one commentator, Rule 24(a)(2) helps courts to adjudicate

actions more efficiently. 5 0 Rule 24(a)(2) helps courts to adjudicate actions
more efficiently by combining two or more claims into a single action. '5'
By combining related claims into a single action, a court often can settle
all of the claims with a single judgment, thus eliminating the need for

multiple trials on related claims.5 2 Second, Rule 24(a)(2) helps to protect

141. See Blake, 554 F.2d at 952 (stating that courts should construe interest requirement
of Rule 24(a)(2) broadly in atypical cases).
142. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that vagueness
of Rule 24(a)(2) permits courts to settle applicant's requests to intervene pragmatically).
143. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing requirements in original
version of Rule 24(a) for interest applicant had to demonstrate to intervene).
144. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing 1946 and 1966 revisions of
Rule 24(a)(2) and reasons for revisions).
145. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing changes in interest requirement set forth in Rule 24(a) brought about by 1946 and 1966 revisions of Rule).
146. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing changes in interest requirement set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) brought about by 1946 and 1966 revisions of rule).
147. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that 1966 version
of Rule 24(a)(2) permits courts to settle intervention questions flexibly).
148. See infra notes 149-56 (discussing policies underlying Rule 24(a)(2)).
149. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 24(a)(2) discussing policies underlying rule); MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-51 to 24-52 (same).
150. See MooRE 's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 24.07[1] at 24-51 to 24-52 (stating that Rule
24(a)(2) promotes more efficient adjudication).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 10911 (1966) (Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 24 stating that rule should promote efficient
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the interests of persons who can demonstrate an interest in an action but
who are not party to the action.'53 If a person demonstrating an interest in
an action has no-right to intervene in the action, that person's interests
could suffer irreparable harm from the outcome of the action.15 4 Therefore,
Rule 24(a)(2) gives persons who are not party to an action the right to
intervene to protect an interest in the action. 5
One commentator discussing the policies underlying Rule 24(a)(2) has
characterized Rule 24(a)(2) as a balance between efficient adjudication of
lawsuits on the one hand and the burden imposed on the original parties
by complex actions on the other. 15 The commentator contends that the
original parties in an action loose control of the action as the rule broadens
the applicant's right to intervene.5 7 Furthermore, broadening the applicant's
right to intervene in an action promotes more efficient adjudication only if
a court can settle the combined cases more quickly than it could settle the
original action and the applicant's claim separately. 58 Thus, an applicant's
right to intervene in an action may not promote efficient adjudication and
may unduly inconvenience the parties in the action. 5 9 Rule 24(a)(2), however,
contains no provisions that would allow courts to balance the rights of the
6
parties in the action with the applicant's rights. '
Although Rule 24(a)(2) only allows courts to consider an applicant's
interests in evaluating an applicant's motion to intervene in an action, one
commentator has suggested that courts should consider judicial efficiency
and the rights of the original parties in the action when considering whether
an applicant has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). 611The commentator

adjudication). The Advisory Committee stated that Rule 24(a)(2) permits an applicant to
intervene who would formerly have had to collaterally attack a judgment in the action.
Ammendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. at 111. According to the
Advisory Committee, a court may adjudicate the dispute more efficiently if the applicant has
a right to intervene in the action and settle the action in a single proceeding. Id.
153. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 24(a)(2) stating that rule give applicant right to intervene
when outcome of action could harm applicant's interests).
154. Id. The Advisory Committee stated that courts should view Rule 24(a)(2) as an
adjunct to Rule 19(a)(2)(i), which requires a court to join persons to an action whose interests
might be harmed by the outcome of the action. Id. The Advisory Committee stated that a
party who could be joined in an action by the court should have the right to enter the action
voluntarily. Id.
155. Id.
156. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-51 to 24-52 (contending that Rule
24(a)(2) balances rights of applicant and parties with court's interest in judicial efficiency).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (setting forth requirements for applicant to intervene
in action); supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)).
161. See MooRe's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-52 (suggesting that courts should
consider interests of all parties when applicant seeks to intervene in action); Infra note 166
(listing cases holding that courts should consider interests of all parties in evaluating applicant's
motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)).
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notes the similarities between the language of Rule 24(a) and the language

of Rule 19 governing joinder of parties. 6 2 Because the language of Rule
24(a) parallels the language of Rule 19, the commentator contends that

courts should consider the factors set forth in Rule 19 for determining when
a court should join a party to an action when determining whether an

applicant has a right to intervene. 63 Rule 19 requires courts to consider
efficiency of adjudication and the interests of the parties in the action when
determining whether a court should join a party to an action.'6

The

commentator argues, therefore, that courts should consider efficient adjudication and the interests of the original parties in an action as factors in
determining whether an applicant has a right to intervene in the action

under Rule 24(a)(2). 165

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits
have recognized the commentator's argument that courts should examine

interests other than those of the applicant when considering whether an
applicant has a right to intervene in an action under Rule 24(a)(2).'6 The
Second Circuit has held that courts considering whether an applicant has a
right to intervene in an action to protect the public's interests in the action

should examine factors beyond the applicant's interests in the action.

67 The

162. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 24(a)(2) indicating similarities between Rule 19 and Rule
24(a)(2)); MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-52 (stating that language of Rule 24(a)(2)
is similar to language of Rule 19).
163. See MooR,'s FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-52 (stating that courts should consider
policies underlying Rule 19 when evaluating applicant's motion to intervene).
164. FED. R. Crv. P. 19; see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 88-94 (1966) (Advisory Committee Note on Rule 19 discussing policies underlying rule and
factors for courts to consider when joining parties).
165. See MooRe's IEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.07[1], 24-52 (stating that courts should consider
policies underlying Rule 19 when evaluating applicant's motion to intervene because language
of Rule 24(a)(2) parallels language of Rule 19).
166. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that courts
should consider all interests in action when evaluating applicant's motion to intervene); United
States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
167. See United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that courts should consider factors other than applicant's interests). In United States
v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered whether an environmental group had a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) in an
action by the Environmental Protection Agency against alleged polluters. Id. at 971-72. In
Hooker Chemicals the E.P.A. sued Hooker alleging that Hooker had discharged pollutants
into the Niagara Falls area. Id. at 972. The applicants, four New York environmental groups,
asserted an interest in the action because the applicants had been exposed to pollutants created
by the defendants. Id. The applicants further alleged that the E.P.A. had failed to take all
necessary actions against the defendants and had failed to make all efforts to learn the scope
of the pollution caused by the defendants. Id. at 974. Thus, the applicants argued, the E.P.A.
inadequately represented the applicants' interests in the action. Id. Therefore, the applicants
asserted a right to intervene in the action under Rule 24(a)(2). Id.
In considering the applicants' motion to intervene, the Second Circuit stated that courts
should consider the objectives that Rule 24(a)(2) was designed to serve when evaluating an
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Second Circuit has explained that factors other than those enumerated in
the four part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) can equal the elements of the
four part test in importance. 68 In particular, the Second Circuit has explained that in public law cases, courts should consider any statutes that
provide the parties with a cause of action and consider whether one of the
parties is a government entity to determine how adequately the parties
represent the public's interests.' 69 The Second Circuit stated that courts
should take great care to examine all interests in an action when an applicant
asserts a right to intervene to protect the public's interests, especially when
70
the outcome of the action might have a substantial impact on public policy.
CONCLUSION

An applicant asserting a right to intervene in an action under Rule
24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests in the action must meet the four
part test set forth in Rule 24(a)(2).' 7' In addition, courts can consider three
other factors in evaluating an applicant's motion to intervene. 72 These three
factors are efficiency of adjudication, the interests of the parties in the
action, and the effect the outcome of the action might have on public
policy. 73 Courts considering an applicant's motion to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2) to represent the public's interests in an action should routinely
consider these three factors. By considering these factors and denying
applicants' motions to intervene in appropriate cases, courts can insure that
an applicant seeking to intervene to represent the public's interests in an
action does not needlessly complicate the action at the expense of the
original parties or waste court time with unnecessary litigation. Although
applicants seeking to represent the public's interests in an action may often
perform a useful service to society, courts must carefully regulate interven-

applicant's motion to intervene. Id. at 983. The Second Circuit further stated that the criteria

set forth in Rule 24(a)(2) should serve only as guidelines to a court. Id. In addition, the
Second Circuit stated that although Rule 24(a)(2) does not specifically require a court to

consider the circumstances surrounding the action, a court should consider factors beyond the
applicant's interests when an applicant seeks to intervene. Id. The Second Circuit observed
that the government was the plaintiff in the action. Id. at 984. The Second Circuit held that
because the government was a party to the action, the applicants had to make a stronger than
usual showing that the parties in the action represented the applicants' interests inadequately
to intervene in the action. Id. at 985. Because the applicants failed to show that the E.P.A.
represented the applicants' interests inadequately, the Second Circuit held that the applicants
had no right to intervene in the action under Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 991.
168. Id.

169. Id. at 983-84.
170. Id. at 988
171. See supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text (discussing four part test set forth in
Rule 24(a)(2)).

172. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why courts should
consider factors other than applicant's interests when evaluating applicant's motion to intervene).

173. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (discussing factors courts should
consider when evaluating applicant's motion to intervene).
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tion under Rule 24(a)(2) to protect the rights of the original parties to the
action and to insure that applicants do not abuse the judicial process by
intervening unnecessarily. By considering these factors, courts can select
those applicants most qualified to intervene and eliminate the applicants
whose motions to intervene unnecessarily complicate the judicial process.
ERNEST E. SHAVER

